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The project title is: The LafargeHolcim Merger, a Merger of (Implied) Interests. This work 
project is a case study about the merger that created the world’s biggest cement company, 
LafargeHolcim. It is focused on the pre-deal situation and the long negotiations that led to the 
merger, with attention too to the poor share price performance after the merger. Questions 
regarding governance, deal rationale, merger of equals, transaction ratios and multiples are the 
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The creation of LafargeHolcim is a recent landmark in the building materials industry and, 
more specifically, in the cement and concrete sectors. In 2014, Lafarge and Holcim were the 
fourth and third largest cement producers in the world, respectively. After the deal, the 
formed company, LafargeHolcim, turned into the biggest cement company in the world1. 
Also, the so called “merger of equals” would be the world’s second biggest merger in 2014 at 
the time it was announced. In a sluggish economic environment in hand with a low interest 
rate context, the creation of LafargeHolcim was the opening of new M&A activity deals of 
the sector – CRH has acquired some disposed assets of LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement 
completed in 2016 the acquisition of 45% of Italcementi, which will be followed by a 
takeover bid for the remaining 55%, and Saint-Gobain that has announced an interest to 
acquire a controlling stake in Sika (the last outside the cement sector, but it is still building 
materials industry). 
The cement industry has some relevant idiosyncrasies. Although several cement companies 
have a global reach, the industry is fragmented worldwide. Competition is local and cement 
can be considered a local commodity as it is not profitable to transport it thousands of 
kilometers away of where it is produced. Actually, transport it is so costly that it rarely travels 
more than 320km by road. It is also an industry that tends towards oligopolies, due to high 
barriers to entry and the fact that it is, thus, cheaper for a firm already producing within this 
industry to expand. For instance, by 2013 a new cement plant producing 1 million tonnes a 
year, the smallest worth building, was costing around US$200 million. The main global 
cement manufacturers include LafargeHolcim, HeidelbergCement, Cemex, CRH (only after 
acquiring the disposals of Lafarge and Holcim, the Irish building materials group turned into a 
                                                          
1 LafargeHolcim can be considered the first or the second biggest cement company in terms of capacity for 
2015 depending of the source – from 286.66 to 386.5 Mt of cement per year, rivaling the first place with the 




major global cement producer), Buzzi, as well as Italcementi, a global player already before 
acquisition. Being a global player is related with countries in operation rather than production 
capacity, once some chinese and indian (among others) players are capable to produce as 
much as or even more than some of the global companies. Nevertheless, the global ones 
mentioned together have around 50% of the market (Exhibit 1). 
The cement industry is facing tough challenges since the economic crisis of 2008. The crisis 
pushed down the global demand for cement and construction materials, foremost in rich 
countries. On the other hand, non-developed countries are already the main consumers of 
cement, whilst developed countries are becoming less important in relative terms, a trend that 
is expected to continue, where demand for cement is already in long-term decline. No more 
demographic pressure, nor rapidly urbanization or industrialization means in practice that 
fewer buildings and bridges, for example, are going up in the future on those places. Cement 
consumption follows the same logic as other more widely traded commodities with a close 
correlation with economic expansion. Consequently, demand in the future is expected to come 
mainly from developing countries, a trend that is happening at least since the 2000’s (Exhibit 
2).  
On those conditions, M&A deals can be one relevant source of growth, with companies 
expanding outside their home markets where growth rates are declining. This is the case of 
the world’s biggest cement-makers, including Lafarge and Holcim. However, criticism also 
exists about M&A deals on the cement sector, as the rush to buy best firms in the best 
locations make the cement giants overpaid, leaving “a trail of value destruction”, according to 
Phil Roseberg of Sanford C. Bernstein, a research and investment firmi. 
Holcim 
A company founded in 1912 in Holderbank (Switzerland), by Adolf Gygi, when two years 
later joined the industrial Ernst Schmidheiny, grand-uncle of the major shareholder Thomas 
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Schmidheiny, that had a stake of 20.11% by the end of 2014 (Exhibit 3). He was Chairman of 
the company from 1984 up to 2003, when resigned its position to be only Board member after 
investigations in Spain about inside trading involving him. By 2014 Holcim had as chairman 
Mr. Wolfgang Reitzle and Bernard Fontana as Chief Executive Officer, as Holcim aims to 
achieve a balanced relationship between management and control by keeping these functions 
separate. In terms of operations, it is a huge company, present at roughly 1500 sites in around 
70 countries across the globe, with around 35% of the firms’ revenue coming from Asia-
Pacific market.  
The Board of Holcim (Exhibit 4) have all members considered “independent according to the 
definition of the Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance”ii, a questionable 
definition of independent because the Board included, among other members, the already 
mentioned Mr. Thomas Schmidheiny, which is Chairman of the BoD of Spectrum Value 
Management Ltd and of Schweizerische Cement-Industrie-Aktiengesellschaft. Dieter Spälti 
is, since 2003, other Board member of Holcim and, nowadays, of LafargeHolcim. Not only, 
he joined Spectrum Value Management Ltd as a partner in 2002 and, since 2006, he has been 
Chief Executive Officer and Member of the Board of Directors at the same company, a firm 
that administers the industrial and private investments of the family of Thomas Schmidheiny. 
Additionally, he is membership in the Board of Directors of Schweizerische Cement-
Industrie-Aktiengesellschaft.  
With a stake of 10.82% of Holcim shares by the end of 2014, the second most important 
shareholder is Eurocement Holding – owned by Filaret Galchev, one of the richest men in 
Russia. Mr. Galchev was building a crescent position on Holcim. There were rumors that 
Thomas felt endangered and so the merger seemed to be appealing, as it will dilute 
Eurocement influence and crescent weight at Holcim. Curiously, Mr. Galchev did not know 
about the deal (the initial negotiations) until he read the press release of April 2014. 
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With the merger, Holcim enters in its most recent chapter of its history. In practice, the 
“merger of equals” meant that Holcim acquired Lafarge and its name was changed to 
LafargeHolcim, as well as its shares changed from HOLN VX to LHN VX, which are traded 
in the Swiss Stock Exchange, while Lafarge shares stopped to be traded and were exchanged 
for new issued LafargeHolcim shares. To conclude, all Holcim shares, including those issued 
as Offer consideration, will be listed on both SIX and Euronext Paris at the end of the 
settlement of the Offer at the latest. 
Lafarge 
Founded in France in 1833, Lafarge has become a world leader in building materials. Mr. 
Bruno Lafont was its Chairman and CEO. By the end of 2014 Lafarge presented 12,843€ 
million in revenues, it was present in 61 countries, had around 63,000 employees and had 
1,612 production sites, a giant of the sector. Furthermore, it was the world leader in cement, 
and number two and four worldwide in aggregates and concrete, respectively. 
Lafarge was historically focused on the Middle East and Africa, where it started its 
international expansion in 1864 by providing lime for the construction of the Suez Canal. By 
the end of 2014, this region accounted for 28.9% of its revenues, the most important for the 
firm. Beyond Middle East and Africa (Exhibit 5), emerging markets were the principal 
source of revenues with a share of 60% while no single emerging countries represents more 
than 6% of revenues. With such geographical portfolio to capture growth, Lafarge had a 
relevant strength, among others, in the strategic lever. 
The Board of Lafarge included some major shareholders (again, Exhibit 3), specifically, 
Nassef Sawiris through NNS Jersey Trust and Paul Desmarais Jr. through Groupe Bruxelles 
Lambert (GBL, controlled by the Desmarais family and Albert Frère, the richest man in 
Belgium). Mr. Sawiris became shareholder and board member of Lafarge after the acquisition 
of Orascom Cement by that company in the end of 2007. Orascom Construction Industries 
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was the parent company of Orascom Cement, and run/own by Mr. Sawiris, which reinvested 
back part of the money received by the selling of Orascom Cement to Lafarge by buying 
Lafarge shares and became a major shareholder on the French firm.  
Regarding GBL, which includes Paul Desmarais Jr., its investment approach was already in 
2013 focused in Europe on countries least scarred by the global financial crisis, like 
Switzerland, Belgium and Germany. Also, Gérard Lamarche, Board member of Lafarge (and 
currently of LafargeHolcim) but not a major shareholder, was Managing Director at Groupe 
Bruxelles, strengthening the influence of this main shareholder. According to him, Mr. Frère 
has a preference for investments close to home, thus “GBL does not buy directly into fast-
growing emerging markets but into European companies that have a fair exposure to them”iii. 
The group yet in 2013 was being affected by Lafarge’s poor performance, once the company 
“has outperformed the market over 10 years but the poor performance of Lafarge and Suez 
has weighed on returns since 2008”iv. 
With the new merger project, Lafarge – and even more Mr. Lafont – were “determined to 
succeed in our merger project with Holcim”v, always showing a great interest for the deal 
realization.  
Negotiations 
The first official rumors regarding a possible combination of both companies occurred on 
April 4, 2014, with the first merger announcement occurring three days after (Exhibit 6). The 
reasons for the merger were, among other factors, the creation of a unique basis for growth 
with a global and well-balanced footprint, “strong innovation capabilities, the highest level of 
research and development, and a consolidated portfolio of solutions and products”, as well as 
the new company will be global market leader in cement, concrete and aggregates, which will 
bring “new opportunities to optimize production and strengthen commercial partnerships”vi. 
For shareholder, the focus is to generate attractive returns by better allocating the capital 
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available and improving returns on capital employed. Considering Lafarge, Moody’s 
indicated it would in line for a credit rating upgrade too if the merger happens as Lafarge had 
a relatively higher leverage than Holcim. 
The key highlights of the initial terms comprised, among other points: (1) a merger of equals 
creating the most advanced group in the building materials industry, (2) an unprecedented 
range of products and services to answer the changing demands of the building materials 
industry and the challenges of increasing urbanization, (3) combined sales amount to CHF 
39bn and EBITDA to CHF 8bn, (4) a transaction structured as a public exchange offer 
initiated by Holcim with an exchange ratio of one Holcim share for one Lafarge share (1:1), 
(5) enhanced performance through incremental synergies totaling more than CHF 1.7bn / 
EUR 1.4bn on a full run-rate basis phased over three years with one third in year one, (6) 
strategic optimization of portfolio while anticipating regulatory requirements through 
divestments: 10% to 15% of the global EBITDA, -(7) combined group to be uniquely 
positioned in 90 countries around the world with a balanced exposure to both developed and 
high growth markets – with no country accounting for more than 10% of combined revenues, 
(8) an equally composed board – 7 from Lafarge, 7 from Holcim – with Wolfgang Reitzle as 
Chairman and Bruno Lafont as CEO and member of the board, (9) unanimous approval by 
the two BoD and full support from core shareholders of both companies2, (10) and an 
expected closing in H1 2015vii.  
In the following months, the firms started to put in practice the divestment process, selected 
the future Executive Committee and obtained some approvals of the merger from authorities 
around the world.  Notwithstanding, on March 16 of 2015, almost one year after the first 
announcement, Holcim shareholders went back and proposed a revision of the terms, around 
the exchange ratio and governance issues. The main reasons for the step back can be 
                                                          
2 As mentioned, Mr. Galchev discovered the merger proposal through the release, so it seems that he is not 
considered a core shareholder at Holcim, even owning more than 10% of the company. 
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summarized in (1) stock price changes, because stock prices of each company moved in 
opposite directions (Lafarge down, Holcim up) in the last months – followed later financial 
results divergences between both firms that only enlarged (Exhibit 7 for the latest results of 
each as separated firms); (2) which means that the initially expected weight of Lafarge 
ownership (47%) in the new company is not close to its contribution to the value of the 
company; (3) the decision of the Swiss National Bank to let the Swiss Franc exchange ratio 
freer in January 2015 resulted in a stronger valuation of the Swiss Franc, which influenced all 
the merger financial terms. Lafarge indicated that it could negotiate only the exchange ratio. 
At the time, the media also mentioned lack of transparency about the negotiations on the back 
stage and possible agreement problems between shareholders, including Holcim main 
shareholder and Eurocement around the exchange ratio and governance issues, like board 
composition. According to reports, Eurocement proposed its owner, Filaret Galchev, to join 
the board of LafargeHolcim and, even though Holcim had earlier said it would be open to 
giving Galchev a seat on the board, he was not on the list of candidates for the LafargeHolcim 
board released by the two companies on April 14, 2015. Not only, almost one month later and 
days before the Holcim’s Extraordinary General Meeting, where the merger would be 
officially approved by shareholders, Eurocement issued a statement on its website publicly 
backing the merger and offering to take an active participation in the merger. Months passed 
and the active role that Eurocement pretended to have did not realize, though. 
The reasons raised and the actions taken that led to the re-negotiation of the deal were seen by 
some analysts as enough to broke the deal. Analysts believed the deal would not happen 
anymore or was, at least, threatened. However, a no-deal scenario meant a huge burn of 
money, including a breakup fee of 350€ million in the merger agreement, plus a break-fee of 
€157.8 million due to CRH if the two companies renege on the deal (once the production 
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facilities to be sold to CRH depends on the merger), and about more $150 million worth of 
investment banking fees that are also at stake.  
Interestingly, on March 20 of 2015, only four days after the possible end of all the merger 
project, the BoD of both companies announced that they have reached an agreement on 
revised terms for the so-called “merger of equals”, showing a strong willingness to advance 
with the deal despite the renegotiations and disagreements. The changes in relation to the first 
announcement were: (1) a new exchange ratio of 9 Holcim shares for 10 Lafarge shares, (2) a 
new CEO, to be proposed by Lafarge Board and accepted by the Holcim Board, (3) Wolfgang 
Reitzle and Bruno Lafont will be non-executive Co-Chairmen of the Board, with Beat Hess as 
Vice-Chairman of the Board. 
The co-chairmenship of the Board raised possible challenges once two persons would have 
the roles usually attributable to just one. When asked if how this model would work, Mr. 
Reitzle responded “You must choose between legal rules and effective ways of dividing up 
the work.”viii. In practice, and symbolically, Mr. Reitzle is the “Statutory Chairman” and his 
name appears first on LafargeHolcim’s Annual Report, followed by the vice-chairman Beat 
Hess and only then by Bruno Lafont, not to mention other parts of the same document where 
Mr. Reitzle has a more prominent role, such as on his signature on pages 4 and 99, where he 
is considered chairman of the board, without the “co-” before. Moreover, Lafont’s 
compensation is aligned to the other members of the board and much lower than Mr. Reitzle’s 
one. Therefore, it is questionable if the co-chairman position of Bruno Lafont is merely a 
courtesy one (more evidence is that on page 138 of LafargeHolcim Annual Report, Mr. 
Reitzle is called as Chairman while Mr. Lafont is Co-Chairman) and to maintain the logic of a 
merger of equals to the public. The need to change the CEO from Bruno Lafont to Eric Olsen 
– appointed in April 09, 2015, a Lafarge executive already involved in integrating the 
previous Blue Circle and Orascom Lafarge acquisitions – raised several questions about the 
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cultural fit of both companies. Olsen is not Swiss nor French (he is American), hopefully 
helping him to reduce political and cultural differences from each side. He clearly left a 
message when he said that “I see my role not only as the operational leader but also as the 
integrator of cultures” and “we are going to make one team, and forget who was at Lafarge 
and who was at Holcim and make one company”ix. 
Still on cultural fit, very different corporate cultures reason for potential problem, although 
yet in 2014 one of the alleged reasons for the merger was the “cultural proximity between the 
two companies”x. Nevertheless, historically Lafarge is known as always having a more 
centralized approach than Holcim. 
Regarding Mr. Bruno Lafont, he seems to be an unpleasant presence for Holcim’s 
shareholders. To start, Lafont apparently made a strategic error when, on a jointly roadshow 
to sell the €42bn merger to investors, he had chosen to use a private jet to fly across the US, 
which is against Holcim’s company guidelines and left its executives how the man who was 
supposed to lead the combined firm could spend much more for a private jet when 
commercial options were available. Continuing, Bruno Lafont would initially retain his CEO 
role, but media investigations stated that Bernard Fontana, Holcim’s chief executive, and his 
team found it increasingly difficult to work with Mr. Lafont. There were attacks over his 
management style as well as his personal qualities. A person involved in the deal said that 
“his nickname in France is Napoleon and I don’t have to tell you more”. Also, Mr. Reitzle and 
his team came to a point where they were simply unwilling to work with Mr. Lafont.xi  
Mr. Lafont, along with Mr. Rolf Soiron – Holcim’s chairman for 11 years, until April 29 of 
2014, which did not stand for re-election and was succeeded by Wolfgang Reitzle – were the 
first a main articulators of the merger in its first stages. At the time, a favorable scenario was 
formed. Both companies by the beginning of 2014 reached similar values and share prices, 
where a deal could be presented as a merger of equals, although Holcim had a better financial 
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position and results than Lafarge. The media also mentioned that Mr. Soiron was about to 
stop his position as Chairman and, according to an insider, wanted to “end on a high”. For Mr. 
Lafont, it was a great opportunity to grow even more in his career, as he was going to be the 
CEO of LafargeHolcim. Additionally, one cement industry insider, who described Soiron as 
“an old fox”, said the former chairman was keen to be associated with a successful merger but 
left its difficult execution to Mr. Reitzle, but “Reitzle was not amused”, he saidxii. 
After the renegotiation of the deal’s terms as mentioned previously, Mr. Lafont had to accept 
be only co-chairman of the new company, but he apparently was still very benefited with the 
deal. Even though he was pushed aside from being CEO of LafargeHolcim after 
renegotiations of the deal terms, the board in July gave him a departure package worth 5.9 
million euro with, in addition, a bonus of 2.5 million euro, plus allowed him to keep certain 
stock options and long-term incentives. This payment package raised the attention of AMF 
(Autorité des marchés financiers), France’s stock market regulator, which started an 
investigation on early October 2015. 
Top executives questions aside, shareholders as members of the Board were common on both 
companies and, thus, the same repeats in LafargeHolcim. Again, as a merger of equals, the 
new Board of Directors of LafargeHolcim would be composed of seven members from 
Lafarge and seven from Holcim.  
Deal Realization 
The Public Exchange Offer was successfully completed in July 07, 2015, when 87.46 percent 
of the share capital of Lafarge S.A. has been tendered to the offer. Three days later, on July 
10, Holcim and Lafarge publicly informed they completed the merger and created 
LafargeHolcim and by July 14 the new LafargeHolcim shares started to be traded. 
The public exchange offer was re-opened for at least 10 trading days, in accordance with the 
AMF general regulation. Holcim shareholders initially set as the maximum percentage of 
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LafargeHolcim share capital acquired by the former Lafarge shareholders in the exchange 
offer as 44.66%xiii, in other words, the maximum share ownership of Lafarge shareholders on 
LafargeHolcim. The result with the public exchange offer and the re-opened period was a 
stake of 43.35% belonging to ex-Lafarge shareholders (Exhibit 8), below what was set. 
Meanwhile, by July 31 the final results of the re-opened period were published, stating that, 
following the settlement-delivery on August 4, 2015, LafargeHolcim will hold 96.41% of the 
share capital and at least 95.25% of the voting rights of Lafarge. For accounting purposes, it 
was considered for the public exchange offer and the re-opened period the close share price of 
July 9, 2015 (Holcim CHF 71.55 whereas Lafarge EUR 61.68, with an exchange ratio 
CHF/EUR of 0.952). With at least 95% of the share capital and voting rights tendered, 
LafargeHolcim could advance with a squeeze-out procedure for all the remaining Lafarge 
shares not tendered, what the firm actually did in October, reducing the influence of minority 
shareholders. 
One month before the squeeze-out, yet in September, an authorized share capital increase 
happened with an exceptional scrip dividend of one new LafargeHolcim share for every 
twenty existing LafargeHolcim shares. The scrip dividend was issued with no fractional 
shares issued and shareholders expecting to receive a not whole number of shares had 
rounded-down whole number, with the difference paid in cash. This procedure can reduce the 
share ownership of small shareholders. The scrip dividend issued represented 5 percent of the 
firm’s share capital and voting rights as of September 3, 2015, or 28,870,252 new shares. 
Finally, the squeeze-out procedure of Lafarge, announced on October 23, 2015, represents the 
final step and completion of the merger. A squeeze-out procedure, or squeezeout, or even 
referred sometimes as freeze[-]out (terms that can be used as synonyms, just as in this case), 
is the “forced sale of stock owned by minority shareholders in a joint-stock company, usually 
in the context of an acquisition”xiv. In other words, the acquiring company is allowed to freeze 
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existing shareholders out of the gains from the merger by forcing the non-tendering 
shareholders to sell their stocks. The remaining Lafarge shareholders received a cash 
indemnification of 60 Euros per share, or 9.45 newly issued LafargeHolcim share for 10 
Lafarge shares. Almost all shares were acquired back for EUR 60 each. With it, Lafarge 
shares were delisted from Euronext Paris. Business combination data (the amount of shares, 
share prices, etc.) can be seen on Exhibit 9. 
Synergies 
The reasons for the merger were wide. Both companies argued prior to the merger that the 
creation of LafargeHolcim would create, among other points: (1) a rebalanced portfolio (i.e., 
more exposure to emerging markets, no country above 10% of sales, divestments mainly 
focused in developed markets), (2) best growth platform in the industry and superior 
operating profitability, (3) attractive dividend payout policy, (4) significant synergies.  The 
cement industry is very capital intensive, with considerable barriers to entry due to high entry 
costs, but with great potential for scale gains through cost competitiveness, operational 
leverage and productivity gains. However, given the size and complexities of merger in 
question, the integration and delivering the promised savings constitute important challenges. 
Run-rate synergies are expected to reach €1.4bn – €1bn from operational synergies at the 
EBITDA level, €200 million from financing and more €200 million from capital expenditures 
synergies. These synergies would be phased-in over three years following the completion of 
the combination, which means synergies of €410 million in the first year, €900 million in the 
second and €1,400 in the third and further years. Additionally, €410 million in one-time 
working capital synergies over three years are expected to happen. By its turn, however, non-
recurring implementation costs are expected to reach 1,000 million Euros during the two 





When concluded the merger, the market share of LafargeHolcim would, in many countries, 
surpass the maximum set by competition authorities. Hence, due to legal constraints, 
divestments in many countries were necessary for the merger to advance in order to avoid 
excessive market concentration and power. In the U.S., for example, under the Hart-Scott 
Rodino (HSR) Act of 1976, all mergers above $60 million (approximately)xv, must be 
approved by the government before the proposed merger occur. However, each country 
normally has its own agency responsible for establishing and implementing competition rules 
and specific policies, which can bring relevant costs, problems and delays on mergers of 
companies with operations throughout the world, including Holcim and Lafarge.  
One exception to the “one country, one set of rules” above mentioned is regarding the 
countries of the European Union (EU), where the European Commission (EC) has established 
above country level the Directorate-General for Competition, or DGComp, responsible for 
the competition policy for the European Union. On this case, the merging parties are required 
to notify the EC, to provide additional information if requested about the proposed merger, 
and wait for approval before proceeding. Even though the EC lacks legal authority to block a 
merger of companies based outside the EU, such as US companies, it can indeed stop a 
takeover or a merger in any or all EU countries by imposing restrictions on the combined 
firm’s operations and sales. Thus, fulfilling competition authority requirements is a crucial 
step for a deal, and a stressing expectation before the agency final decision for firms’ 
shareholders and directors. 
For the Holcim and Lafarge merger, in order to obtain regulatory approval asset disposals 
were necessary to complete the deal. Divestments can be hard to deal but, on the other hand, it 
would be a good way for the new firm to reduce its presence in developed market to improve 
its profit margin and to free capital and redeploy it where it is more necessary. The two 
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companies were willing to reduce their presence in Europe, where there is a chronicle 
problem of excess capacity, where Europe pushes down the EBITDA margin of both 
companies separately and together (Exhibit 10). Lafarge and Holcim started the divestment 
project for the merger in 2014, by formally notifying the proposed merger to the European 
Commission (and regulators of other regions too). By December of that year, the companies 
received clearance from the European Commission for their proposed merger, with assets to 
be disposed in Europe located in France, Germany, United Kingdom, Hungary, Romania, 
Serbia and Slovakia. In their words, it is a “strategic portfolio optimization”, which will make 
possible a “strong capital structure after divestments”xvi. In their view, the asset disposals 
would reinvigorate the firm’s balance sheet by reducing outstanding debt. This goes in 
direction to one of the strategic goals desired with the merger of Lafarge and Holcim, namely 
the pro-active management and disciplined capital allocation, based on a systematic review of 
the market attractiveness and performance of its assets.  
The total amount of disposals was huge, close to €8 billion in total, capable to form a world 
giant if all assets remain under the same company. The main one started on February 2. 2015, 
when both Lafarge and Holcim announced they had started exclusive negotiations regarding 
the sale of plants and assets over 685 locations in 11 countries – including the 7 EU countries 
aforementioned, Canada, Brazil and the Philippines – for an enterprise value of 6.5 billion 
euros (with 4.2 billion euros from Lafarge divestment side) with the Irish company CRH. This 
deal was completed on August 3, 2015, with the exception of the Philippines (expected to 
close in Q3 2015). The assets sold include millions tons of cement capacity, aggregates, 
asphalt and ready-mixed concrete and turned CRH the third largest building materials player 
globally and the number two in aggregates.  
In financial terms (comparable deals on Exhibit 11), CRH paid 1.25x EV/sales and 8.7x 
EV/EBITDA for the disposals, considering 2014 figures. Beyond CRH disposals, 
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LafargeHolcim sold some US assets, most of them to Summit Materials for €420 million at 
10x EBITDA, and also disposals in India plus some disposals done on a standalone (Lafarge 
and Holcim still in separate) basis previous to the merger. To sum-up, in total the “strategic 
optimization of portfolio while anticipating regulatory requirements through divestments” 
represents around 10% to 15% of the new firm’s EBITDAxvii. It also represents more than 5% 
of sales, higher than the 1.5-2.5% usually seen in the sector. Notwithstanding, for 2016 the 
company expects to divest more CHF 3.5 billion in assets. 
First months as LafargeHolcim 
While Lafarge shares were delisted, Holcim shares turned into LafargeHolcim shares, thus 
before the merger LafargeHolcim shares were only Holcim shares. After the merger, 
LafargeHolcim share price started to decline (Exhibit 12). Investors were reluctant about 
many aspects. Some argued that Lafarge had a much weaker balance sheetxviii (Exhibits 13.a 
and 13.b). Also, the macroeconomic scenario was contributing to get things worse. Yet in 
2015, the first earnings of LafargeHolcim were hit by economic problems in China and Brazil 
followed by cut in investments. Plus, problems in other markets, such as Russia and Iraq, 
could be harmful for 2015 last quarter results. Mr. Olsen, the CEO, argued that a reduction on 
earnings was a “natural consequence” of a post-merger portfolio review and would not affect 
future earnings potentialxix. He was trying to demonstrate that the benefits of the merger 
surpass the problems happening plus market and media questioning if the firm is not too big 
to be managedxx. However, some questions still arise. Are the benefits in fact superior than 
the problems? When benefits will be evident? He is the CEO and has this function, but do 






Exhibit 1 – Leading Cement Manufacturers 
 
Based on Statista data. Only 
LafargeHolcim, Heidelberg, Cemex 
and Italcementi have 48% of market 
share. Considering the size of CRH 
and Buzzi, it is strongly likely that the 
market share of all those firms surpass 
the 50% world’s market share. 
 
 









At Dec. 31, 2014 # shares held # votes held % of total shares issued % of total voting rights
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert - 
including Paul Desmarais Jr. 60,568,754 120,876,019 21.10% 29.30%
NNS - Nassef Sawiris 40,063,011 80,126,022 13.90% 19.40%
Dodge & Cox 20,978,862 28,396,758 7.30% 6.90%
Subtotal 42.30% 55.60%
Source: Lafarge 2014 Annual  Report, p. 196
At Dec. 31 2014 # shares held % of total shares issued Obs.:
Thomas Schmidheiny 65,777,912 20.11%
Eurocement Holding AG 35,402,772 10.82%
Harris Associates L.P. 16,163,815 4.94% April 14, 2014
Harbour International Fund declared holdings 9,840,977 3.01% August 4, 2014
Black-Rock Inc. 9,582,830 2.93% January 26, 2015
Subtotal 41.81%
Source: Holcim 2014 Annual  Report, p. 234
Lafarge Major Shareholders
Holcim Major Shareholders
At Dec. 31, 2015 # shares held % of total shares issued Versus ( in %) right after the merger
Thomas Schmidheiny 69,068,278 11.40%
Groupe Bruxelles Lambert - including Paul 
Desmarais Jr. 57,238,551 9.40%
Eurocement* 37,172,910 6.10%
NNS Jersey Trust - Nassef Sawiris 28,935,639 4.80%
Dodge & Cox 19,835,811 3.30%
Harbour International Fund 10,310,884 > 3%
Black-Rock Inc. 9,582,830 > 3%
Harris Associates L.P. 18,412,635 3.03%
Subtotal 38.03% (only shareholders with more than 3%)
Souce: LafargeHolcimm Annual  Report 2015, p. 278.
* Declared on February 12, 2016 i t has  disposed a l l  shares .
LafargeHolcim Major Shareholders
11.87% on July 16, 2015
9.84% on July 18, 2015
6.39% on July 22, 2015
4.97% on July 16, 2015






Exhibit 4 – Board of Directors of Holcim, Lafarge and LafargeHolcim  
  
Holcim Lafarge LafargeHolcim
CEO: Bernard Fontana CEO: Bruno Lafont CEO: Eric Olsen, from Lafarge side
BoD at Jan 14, 2015 End of 2014 BoD at the end of 2015
Wolfgang Reitzle - Chairman Bruno Lafont - Chairman and CEO
(H) Wolfgang Reitzle - Co-chairman 
(statutory Chairman)
Beat Hess Philippe Dauman (H) Beat Hess - Vice-chairman
Alexander Gut Paul Desmarais Jr. (H) Alexander Gut
Adrian Loader Oscar Fanjul - Vice-chairman (H) Adrian Loader
Jürg Oleas Gérard Lamarche (H) Thomas Schmidheiny
Thomas Schmidheiny Nassef Sawiris (H) Hanne Birgitte Breinbjerg Sørensen
Hanne Birgitte Breinbjerg Sørensen Philippe Charrier (H) Dieter Spälti
Dieter Spälti Juan Gallardo (L) Bruno Lafont - Co-chairman
Anne Wade Ian Gallienne (L) Bertrand Collomb*
Mina Gerowin (L) Philippe Dauman
Jérôme Guiraud (L) Paul Desmarais Jr.
Luc Jeanneney (L) Oscar Fanjul
Hélène Ploix (L) Gérard Lamarche





Souces: Holcim Annual Report 2014, p.10 | Lafarge Annual Report 2014 | LafargeHolcim Annual Report 2015, p. 8
*Honorary Chairman of Lafarge, but his term of office as a member of Board of Directors of Lafarge ended in May 2012
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Exhibit 5 – Holcim and Lafarge 2014 Revenues by Geographies  
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Exhibit 6 – Merger Main Facts Timeline 
  
Date Event
04/04/2014 First public announcement regarding a possible combination of both companies
07/04/2014 1st announcement
02/02/2015
Holcim and Lafarge announce a project to sell assets to CRH for an enterprise 
value of EUR 6.5 Bn [CHF 6.8 Bn] in the context of their planned merger
16/03/2015 Holcim shareholders reject proposed terms
20/03/2015 New agreement announcement
09/04/2015 Eric Olsen appointed as future CEO of LHN
14/04/2015 Future BoD of LHN nominated
16/04/2015 Documentation related to the proposed merger
08/05/2015 Holcim shareholders approve all motions at Extraordinary General Meeting
11/05/2015 Lafarge BoD issues a favorable opinion
08/07/2015 Public Exchange Offer completed successfully
09/07/2015 Final results of the P.ex. Offer
10/07/2015 Holcim and Lafarge complete merger and create LHN
14/07/2015 LHN starts trading on SIX in Zurich and Euronext in Paris
















Holcim Ltd: Half-year Report 2015 - Key figures 
January–June 2015 2014 1 ±%
±% 
like-for-like
Annual cement production capacity million t  211.3  208.8 2 +1.2 +1.2
Sales of cement million t  67.6  68.9 -2.0 -2.1
Sales of mineral components million t  1.8  1.6 +18.2 -10.7
Sales of aggregates million t  72.0  69.6 +3.4 -2.3
Sales of ready-mix concrete million m
3
 18.2  18.1 +0.6 -3.0
Sales of asphalt million t  4.6  4.1 +13.1 +13.1
Net sales million CHF 8,646 8,926 -3.1 -0.2
Operating EBITDA million CHF 1,471 1,595 -7.8 -5.1
Operating EBITDA adjusted3 million CHF 1,557 1,617 -3.7 -1.1
Operating EBITDA margin %  17.0  17.9
Operating EBITDA margin adjusted3 %  18.0  18.1
Operating profit million CHF  827 943 -12.3 -12.4
Operating profit adjusted3 million CHF  912 965 -5.5 -5.5
Operating profit margin %  9.6  10.6
Operating profit margin adjusted3 %  10.6  10.8
EBITDA million CHF 1,972 1,798 +9.6
Net income million CHF  690  657 +4.9
Net income margin %  8.0  7.4
Net income – shareholders of Holcim Ltd million CHF  573  485 +18.0
Cash flow from operating activities million CHF  220  194 +13.6 +9.0
Cash flow margin %  2.5  2.2
Net financial debt million CHF 9,057 9,520 2 -4.9 +3.6
Total shareholders' equity million CHF 15,721 17,430 2 -9.8
Personnel 63,314 67,137 2 -5.7 -6.0
Earnings per share CHF 1.62            1.37          4 +18.2
Fully diluted earnings per share CHF 1.62            1.37          4 +18.2
Principal key figures in USD (illustrative) 
Net sales million USD 9,131 10,019 -8.9
Operating EBITDA million USD 1,553 1,790 -13.2
Operating EBITDA adjusted3 million USD 1,644 1,815 -9.4
Operating profit million USD 873 1,058 -17.5
Operating profit adjusted3 million USD 963 1,084 -11.1
Net income – shareholders of Holcim Ltd million USD  605  545 +11.1
Cash flow from operating activities million USD  232  218 +6.9
Net financial debt million USD 9,724 9,625 2 +1.0
Total shareholders' equity million USD 16,878 17,622 2 -4.2
Earnings per share USD 1.71            1.54          4 +11.0
Net sales million EUR 8,182 7,309 +11.9
Operating EBITDA million EUR 1,392 1,306 +6.6
Operating EBITDA adjusted3 million EUR 1,473 1,324 +11.3
Operating profit million EUR  782  772 +1.3
Operating profit adjusted3 million EUR  863  790 +9.2
Net income – shareholders of Holcim Ltd million EUR  542  397 +36.4
Cash flow from operating activities million EUR  208  159 +31.3
Net financial debt million EUR 8,698 7,916 2 +9.9
Total shareholders' equity million EUR 15,097 14,492 2 +4.2
Earnings per share EUR 1.53            1.12          4 +36.6
4 Restated due to the commitment to distribute a scrip dividend.
2 As of December 31, 2014.
Principal key figures in EUR (illustrative) 
3 Excluding merger-related costs only.
1 Restated due to changes in accounting policies.
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Exhibit 8 – LafargeHolcim (LHN) Ownership by Origin Company 
 
 
Exhibit 9 – Business Combination  





Holcim shares outstanding 327,086,376
Number of LHN shares issued (exchanged tendered Lafarge shares) 250,318,676
LHN shares after closing the tender offer 577,405,052
Holcim shareholders weight on LHN 56.65%
Lafarge shareholders weight on LHN 43.35%
Sources: Annual Reports
Lafarge Holcim
Share price as at July 09, 2015 61.68 €           71.55CHF       
Shares outstanding 288,411,188 327,086,376
Sources: Bloomberg data, Holcim and Lafarge Reports
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Exhibit 10 – EBITDA Margin by Geographies 
 
  
FY 2014 FY 2014
EBITDA Margin (%) 19.37 EBITDA Margin (%) 17.91
  Latin America 28.60   Middle East & Africa 28.10
  Africa Middle East 32.10   Central and Eastern Europe 21.20
  North America 18.00   Latin America 21.10
  Asia Pacific 18.40   Asia 19.40
  Europe 17.80   North America 19.20








Sep-13 Lafarge Honduras Cement Cementos Argos 561 -  8.6 x
 Nov-12 Lafarge (UK) Cement plant  Mittal Investments 440 - -
Sep-12 Lafarge (N America) Cement plant Eagle Materials Inc. 446 2.50 x 16.5 x
 Mar-12 Cimpor - Cimentos de Portugal Manufacturer & seller of cement Camargo (Intercement) 7,130 2.40 x 8.7 x
May-11 Lafarge (Southeastern US assets) Cement, grinding plant Cementos Argos 760 3.20 x 16.0 x
May-10 Tarmac France & Belgium Concrete Fondations Capital 87 - 4.1 x
Feb-10 Cimpor (31.2% stake) Cement, aggregates, concrete Camargo Correa 8,584 3.00 x 10.4 x
 Jul-09 Lafarge Chile Cement, aggregates, concrete Brescia Group 661 - 7.4 x
 Jun-09 Cemex Australia Cement, aggregates, concrete Holcim 1,623 1.00 x 5.6 x
May-09 Lafarge Turkey Cement, aggregates, concrete Oyak 217 - 10.0 x
 Nov-08 Cemex Canary Islands Cement, aggregates, concrete Cimpor 207 0.90 x 4.4 x
 Nov-08 Lafarge Italy Cement, aggregates, concrete Sacci 369 2.50 x 16.1 x
Dec-07 Orascom Cement Cement Lafarge 14,965 10.90 x 22.3 x
May-07 Hanson Aggregates HeidelbergCement 19,104 2.30 x 12.2 x
Apr-07 Rinker Aggregates Cemex 15,163 2.80 x 10.5 x
Feb-07 Florida Rock Aggregates Vulcan Materials 4,510 3.30 x 11.2 x
 Jun-06 Uniland Cement, concrete & aggregates Cementos Portland V. 2,723 4.70 x 13.6 x
Dec-05 Uniland Cement, concrete & aggregates CRH 1,468 2.90 x 8.7 x
Dec-05 Cementos Lemona Cement Cementos Portland V. 535 4.10 x 12.4 x
 Jun-05 Heidelberg Cement Spohn Cement 8,498 1.50 x 8.7 x
Apr-05 Loma Negra Cement Camargo Correa 1,000 3.60 x 7.9 x
 Jan-05 Aggregate Industries Aggregates Holcim 4,490 1.40 x 9.2 x
Sep-04 RMC Aggregates Cemex 5,991 0.80 x 8.2 x
Aug-04 Aalborg Portland & Unicon Cement & concrete Cementir 700 1.40 x 5.7 x
 Mar-04 Secil Cement & concrete CRH 544 2.20 x 7.3 x
 Mar-03 Cementos de Hispania Cement Holcim 204 3.10 x 8.6 x
Dec-02 Secil Cement & concrete Semapa 471 2.30 x 6.2 x
May-01 Blue Circle North America Cement & concrete Votorantim 707 2.70 x 6.6 x
 Jun-01 Dyckerhoff Cement & concrete Buzzi Unicem 776 2.00 x 10.7 x
 Jan-01 Blue Circle Cement Lafarge 7,881 2.50 x 9.1 x
 Nov-00 Jura Cement, concrete & aggregates CRH 233 0.80 x 7.0 x
Sep-00 Southdown Cement, concrete & aggregates Cemex 2,837 2.20 x 7.0 x
Aug-00 Tarmac (America) Cement & concrete Titan 379 1.00 x 6.5 x
Feb-00 Ameriyah Cement Cement Cimpor 397 3.30 x 9.8 x
 Nov-99 Pioneer Aggregates & concrete Hanson 3,070 1.20 x 8.8 x
 Nov-99 Tarmac Aggregates & concrete Anglo American 2,917 1.40 x 9.3 x
 Nov-99 Rugby Cement RMC 1,621 1.00 x 11.5 x
Sep-99 Lone Star Cement Dyckerhoff 1,167 3.20 x 9.1 x
 Jul-99 Thompson-McCully Aggregates CRH 422 1.70 x 8.0 x
May-99 Scancem Cement Heidelberg 2,204 1.40 x 6.6 x
 Jul-99 Finnsementti & Lohja Rudus Cement CRH 448 1.70 x 6.5 x
Median 2.20 x 8.7 x
Source: Barclays
EV as a multiple of
Date Target Sector Acquirer EV ($m)
29 
 
Exhibit 12 – Timeline Returns Table and Graph 
 
Graph of returns evolution from one month before the first announcement until one year after the 
deal realization for Lafarge shares (although delisted in the end of 2015), LafargeHolcim shares 
(Holcim before the deal), SXOP3 and SMI indexes (source: Google Finance) 
 
  
                                                          
3 The SXOP Index presented on the table and on the graph, also called the Stoxx 600 Europe Building Materials 
Index, is an index that comprises the considered 21 most important European building materials companies, 
including companies with cement as main source of revenues but not only. LafargeHolcim, Saint-Gobin, CRH, 
HeidelbergCement, Vinci, i.e., are some of the companies components of the index. LafargeHolcim weight on 





07/03/2014 Pre-announcement 72.40 8378.580 343.410 0% 0% 0%
07/04/2014 Announcement 81.50 8405.100 359.620 13% 0% 5%
20/03/2015 Re-announcement 76.15 9396.290 407.630 5% 12% 19%
09/07/2015 Deal* 71.55 8985.080 382.390 -1% 7% 11%
08/07/2016 One year after the deal (closest date) 40.80 8037.940 364.730 -44% -4% 6%
*The merger was completed one day after, but the exchange ocurred on July 09















Exhibit 13.a – Holcim Key Financial Data 
Source: BNP Paribas Equity Research of 16.03.2015 
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Exhibit 13.b – Lafarge Key Financial Data 
Source: BNP Paribas Equity Research of 16.03.2015 
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Exhibit 14 – Latest Trends (Up to November of 2015, When Published the Research) 
 
 
Exhibit 15 – Cement Intensity of GDP vs. GDP Per Capita 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley Research 
– Sustainable and Responsible, 
Cement Industry: From grey to 











FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011 FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011
EV/Sales 2.17 2.06 1.70 1.41 1.88 1.71 1.65 1.46
EV/EBITDA 12.09 9.66 9.20 7.93 9.72 8.64 8.95 7.65
EV/EBIT 19.05 13.95 14.04 12.82 15.79 14.28 19.91 15.67
EV/FCF 60.89 31.52 23.01 24.28 37.04 31.98 25.62 22.00
P/E 116.16 28.19 39.86 77.05 19.66 17.07 35.40 58.43
P/Free Cash Flow191.88 100.30 26.47 14.20 46.84 37.40 23.25 16.47
ROCE 0.95 3.98 2.31 3.69 7.65 7.79 3.67 1.57
Net Debt/EBITDA 4.03 3.43 3.76 4.26 2.61 2.43 2.64 2.88
FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011 FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011
EV/Sales 1.51 1.53 1.19 1.16 0.92 0.92 0.79 0.82
EV/EBITDA 9.00 8.19 7.13 6.60 10.96 20.18 9.33 9.01
EV/EBIT 13.95 13.41 13.85 11.28 19.02 166.50 17.80 17.12
EV/FCF 34.28 57.26 23.46 31.30 20.76 25.97 29.12 29.71
P/E 16.61 16.87 44.07 16.64 25.22 24.22 20.51 18.60
P/Free Cash Flow 19.86 31.86 12.10 12.82 17.47 20.82 22.45 21.86
ROCE  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Net Debt/EBITDA 3.27 3.22 2.98 3.48 1.64 3.64 1.99 2.21
FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011 FY 2014 FY 2013 FY 2012 FY 2011
EV/Sales 1.13 1.16 1.02 1.03 1.01 0.95 0.83 0.81
EV/EBITDA 7.01 8.19 14.25 8.13 9.34 8.87 7.52 6.94
EV/EBIT 20.16 30.92  - 37.63 15.79 14.85 12.49 11.31
EV/FCF  - 43.54 31.99 111.17  -  -  -  - 
P/E  -  -  - 28.07 19.34 25.40 20.80 13.95
P/Free Cash Flow 12.19 15.31 8.24 29.09  -  -  -  -
ROCE  -  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 











(GSWISS 1, 10, 
30 Indexes)
France          
(GFRN 1, 10, 30 
Indexes)
Germany            
(GDBR 1, 10, 30 
Indexes)
World
One year -0.216 -0.018 -0.064
10 years 0.319 0.826 0.541
30 years 0.784 1.898 1.389
Corporate Tax rate, 2014 18.01% 33.33% 29.58% 30.00%
Corporate Tax rate dos ARs, 2014
Equity Risk Premiums 5.81% 6.41% 5.81% 7.30%
Holcim 1.296 (against SMI Index)
Lafarge 1.191 (against CAC Index)
Sources : Bloomberg, KPMG, Damodaran (July 2015)
Historical Beta (last 5 years up to deal date)
Countries
Risk-free rate            





The LafargeHolcim merger 
Synopsis 
In 2014, Holcim and Lafarge announced a merger of equals agreement between the two 
companies, which was realized one year later and created the world’s greatest cement 
company and a huge player on the building materials sector. The formed company, 
LafargeHolcim (LHN), became the world’s largest cement company and, in theory, it would 
be in a better condition to face increasing competition and a lagging and weak economic 
recovery from the 2008 global crisis. 
The current Teaching Note should be analysed together with the respective Case Study and 
should be focused on: (I) merger rationale, (II) merger of equals concept and the case of this 
merger along with gains and losses for each side of the merger, (III) corporate governance 
issues, (IV) the asset disposals deals and (V) impact of the merger on EPS. The suggested 
discussion questions and its answers based on the case are the followings below. 
Question 1 
What transaction drivers can you identify of the deal, in other words, the merger rationale? 
Do they make sense? 
The key points for the merger were (1) a merger of equals to create the most advanced group 
in the building materials industry, with a truly global and balanced footprint, (2) creating the 
best growth platform in the industry, (3) positioning their business to meet changing market 
needs through a bigger focus on emerging markers, (4) a unique value proposition, including: 
unique global portfolio, superior growth and margins, augmented by significant synergies and 
disciplined financial approach focused on returns. 
The relevant portfolio complementarity would in principle help LHN to achieve market 
leadership across all continents. By re-allocating the group capital more efficiently, the 
merger allows both sides to rely on each other’s investment plans, freeing capital to be 
reallocated where needed. This enables to reposition the group (through Western Europe 
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disposals, but not only) and grow through synergies, even in a low-growth environment. This 
can in a certain way stimulate growth momentum that was constrained. The combined group 
can explore massive synergy potential, representing €1.4bn of EBITDA net of disposal 
impact. Still in terms of freeing capital, it would be also relevant by finding more sources of 
cost savings with the merger, but the risk of cost cutting plans hurting its’ own performance 
or cutting too much into the “muscle” and not “fat” should not be forgotten to be managed. 
The drivers given for the merger make sense with the macro-environment and give base for 
the realization of the merger. This means that the problems that emerged with the merger are 
not related with its theoretical potential, but with its implementation, deal terms, and short-
term macro-economic factors that drove down market expectations, and share price, of 
LafargeHolcim. Additionally, the potential synergies only reinforce the reasons for the fusion. 
Question 2 
The merger between Lafarge and Holcim, in your opinion, could be called in reality a 
“merger of equals”? What where the gains and losses for each side? Explain. 
Although Holcim and Lafarge always maintained the message of a merger of equals, in reality 
it indicated to be a friendly takeover. The reason for not being a merger of equals are: (1) the 
weight of Lafarge in the new company of 43.35%, below the expected 50% once each part 
was considered equal; (2) the new exchange ratio, favorable to Holcim; (3) the renegotiation 
of new directors for the firm, favorable to Holcim, with the co-chairmanship model being in 
practice one chairman (Mr. Reitzle, from Holcim). 
The initial idea of a merger of equals, catalyzed still in 2014 with market dynamics (aligned 
share prices and exchange rates, allowing a 1:1 swap ratio), although later adapted for new 
terms, including a new ratio (10 Lafarge:9Holcim), turned possible the justification of a 
merger of equals, when no premium is paid to either side. Holcim shareholders paid a 
premium of -0.61% (in practice a zero, due to rounded values and possible slightly different 
exchange rate used versus the one used by LHN on its report) per each Lafarge share tendered 
in order to control Lafarge and realize the merger (Exhibit TN1). 
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Regarding gains and losses, this was a great deal for Holcim in a first moment. Only through 
a merger of equals that one company normally can acquire other without paying a premium, 
which is excellent to preserve value for Holcim shareholders’. Exhibit TN2 multiples show 
that Holcim paid considerably less for Lafarge than comparable deals (Exhibit 7 of the Case). 
However, the question of when synergies and results would be big enough to demonstrate that 
it was good decision for Holcim remains. In fact, takeovers have one big benefit over a 
merger, mainly merger of equals, which is that in a takeover one side pays a premium and 
must justify it. Hence, at least one of the sides would probably analyze twice if merging 
makes sense, beyond secondary reasons for it. For Mr. Schmidheiny, Holcim’s main 
shareholder, the deal was with no doubt a gain because he maintained his position of main 
shareholder and was successful in removing Eurocement (Mr. Galchev) from LHN (Exhibit 3 
of the case shows that Eurocement shorted its position on LHN in early 2016). 
For Lafarge shareholder, it was expected to be a good deal by combining it with a firm in 
better financial condition. The merger would reduce Lafarge side debt – debt level was not 
significantly high, but even Moody’s indicated that the merger would make Lafarge credit 
rating better by merging it with Holcim, with lower debt level – to improve cash-flow 
generation (Exhibit TN3) and to produce better results, but if share price remains low and 
synergies do not come, then even long-run benefits are doubtful. In control terms the deal was 
positive; half the board of LHN comes from Lafarge with a weight close to 43% into the new 
firm, composed of main shareholders or people directly related to them. Thus, Lafarge 
shareholders gained proportionally more power than Holcim’s over LafargeHolcim. 
Question 3 
 What governance issues do you identify by reading the case? Are there any perverse 
incentives from any character? 
Perverse incentives are the unethical or the ones that do not beneficiate overall shareholders. 
They are, in fact, incentives good for specific individuals – a shareholder, a director or other 
stakeholder – and generally do not choose the best outcomes to most of the parts involved.  
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Thomas Schmidheiny – he was in the past already involved in trouble with the inside trading 
investigation over him. Regarding this merger, the conflict of interests between him and Mr. 
Galchev are evidence of conflict of interests. With his position at the Board and influence 
over other members, he blocked Mr. Galchev interest on having a more active role on the 
merger, on having a seat on the board and even negotiations started without his consent. All 
was attributed to fear from Thomas and his family of losing the control of the family founded 
company, definitely a perverse incentive. The media mentioned lack of transparency about the 
negotiations on the back stage and the agreement problems among shareholders, which is bad 
in terms of governance once the public and small shareholders became unaware of what is 
going on in a, ironically, public company, where this is not supposed to happen. The most 
important point, however, is that if the merger of Holcim with Lafarge was motivated and 
advanced by Thomas because he wanted to maintain his position as the most important 
shareholder and block any other shareholder of becoming more powerful (namely on this case 
Mr. Galchev), instead of being motivated by reasons common to all shareholders, like 
creation of value and the best way to develop the company, then there was a relevant 
governance issue and a perverse incentive. 
Dieter Spälti – is not an independent member due to his strict relationship with Thomas. 
Even though Mr. Schmidheiny is the major shareholder of Holcim/LHN, Dieter is strongly 
inclined to protect the interests of Thomas instead of all shareholders. As stated, he joined 
Spectrum Value Management Ltd as a partner in 2002 (before joining Holcim, in 2003). Since 
2006, he has been Chief Executive Officer and Member of the Board of Directors at the same 
company, a firm that administers the industrial and private investments of the family of Mr. 
Schmidheiny. Thus, his decisions on the board of Holcim and LafargeHolcim are probably 
much conditioned by his position at Spectrum Value and the relationship with Thomas and his 
family. It is then questionable if his actions at Holcim/LafargeHolcim are done for the benefit 
of all shareholders. A strong evidence of this is what happened to Mr. Galchev, the second 
biggest shareholder of Holcim, which seems to have been neglect on his requirements to the 
board of directors, what favored more Thomas position.  
39 
 
Bruno Lafont – agency costs involving him are identified. Probably the stronger evidence of 
it is the payment package that he was granted, which is being investigated by AMF. The deal 
was also a great opportunity to become CEO of an even bigger and relevant company, adding 
to this ego reasons mentioned on the case. For Holcim shareholders, he also demonstrated 
unwilling behaviors, such as spending too much money for the roadshow to present the 
merger to shareholders and problems with his management style. 
Rolf Soiron – the former chairman of Holcim had personal motivations for the merger. He 
wanted to end his career with a remarkable realization and a successful merger had a strong fit 
with his objective, even more to create the world’s most important cement company. 
Gérard Lamarche – managing director at Groupe Bruxelles Lambert (GBL), the holding 
group of Albert Frère and the Canadian Demarais family, since 2012. He had strong 
motivation to make the deal happen. His motivation, though, came from a huge conflict of 
interest, originated by his position at GBL. As managing director, the deal would be a good 
mark for his career, an undesirable incentive if this is not aligned with other players. Frère and 
his group prefer to invest close to home, in companies with exposure to emerging markets. 
Also, it was expressed their interest to invest in Switzerland. Finally, Lafarge weak 
performance was harming the returns of the group already in 2013, and the exhibits show that 
Lafarge performance got even worse since that time. It is, thus, evident that for GBL the 
merger with Holcim was a great deal to solve all those problems aforementioned.  
Consequently, Lamarche (along with GBL and its shareholders on Lafarge) had perverse 
motivations for the merger. However, this motivation seemed to be perverse but, on that case, 
not necessarily bad for Lafarge. It is bad indeed for Holcim, which was doing a bad deal. 
Nassef Sawiris – the second largest Lafarge shareholder through NNS Holding had also a 
perverse incentive for the merger but, such as GBL and Mr. Lamarche, his incentive was not 
an issue for others shareholders of Lafarge, once his actions would be good for, generally, all 
shareholders. The problem was for Holcim side, again, like GBL and Lamarche motivations. 
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Exhibit 7 shows that Lafarge paid too high for Orascom when compared to other acquisitions, 
the most expensive of the list in ratio terms (this acquisition is questionable in terms of 
governance, but escapes from the subject and thus will not be developed here). Sawiris used 
the same strategy of when Orascom was acquired by Lafarge with the merger to form 
LafargeHolcim, which is being acquired and becoming a relevant shareholder with more 
power than before once the company is bigger. Holcim acquired Lafarge for a price that is just 
too high once Lafarge was overvalued in relation to its results (even with smaller weight of 
Lafarge on the new company versus Holcim and also with the new exchange ratio that make 
the deal better for Holcim. Further developed on question 5). 
To sum-up, both GBL and Sawiris were keen to close de deal for the same reason: Lafarge 
was relatively weak in performance terms and overvalued (as ratios can show), so merger it 
with Holcim would be an easy way rebalance the firm financials and improve return for 
shareholders. Sawiris became shareholder of LHN similarly as he did to enter Lafarge, 
whereas GBL would try to recover performance by the merger, by investing accordingly to 
Frère’s strategy and his holding. They have perverse incentives, at the expense of Holcim 
tough, so it is not ethical but still not a problem for Lafarge side. 
An analysis of the merger leads to the conclusion that the merger itself happened because of 
individual motivations, many of these unrelated between each other but complementary 
towards the realization of a merger among Holcim and Lafarge, justified by a favorable 
market condition that facilitated the formal reason for the deal. 
Question 4 
Analyze the asset disposals to CRH and Summit Materials. Do they were good deals? When 
possible, analyze it from a financial and a strategic view. 
The reason for these perspectives are that the financial side gives sometimes basis for some of 
the strategic reasons while other times they are different and go in distinct ways. The asset 
disposals to CRH and Summit Materials are analyzed in the points below.  
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1- Regulatory reasons: without asset disposals authorities in many countries would block the 
merger of the companies within their own countries, nulling the merger realization. It is 
basically a strategic point, but fundamental for the completion of the deal. 
2- Asset sales for merger fit: sell assets that no longer make sense to hold when the best 
assets of each company are combined, having no more value for LafargeHolcim. It is as 
well an opportunity for the company to be more focused towards its objectives, like 
investing in better projects with higher cash flow generation and focusing on more 
attractive markets (generally, more weight on emerging markets and less on developed 
markets), an important strategic point considering the cement trends of the last years and 
the future perspectives. It is as well financially important once higher cash flow 
generation increases the value of the company, enables sustainable dividends and more 
investments to maintain its leadership position on the world. Linked to it but secondarily, 
it is an attempt to soften market fear that LafargeHolcim could be too big to be managed, 
which can impact stock performance.  
3- To improve EBITDA margin: disposals of assets with low margin will improve the firm’s 
EBITDA margin, however disposals reduce cash-flow generation and so it would be 
financially interesting only if the price paid was superior than the present value of future 
cash-flows. It is strategically important to raise own money to invest and presumably 
grow more, and/or improve dividends, which raises the firm’s market attractiveness, all 
factor aligned with the overall strategy of LafargeHolcim. 
4- Multiples: finally, it is important to compare the disposals with other deals of the sector, 
in order to reach a conclusion whether the deals were good for Holcim and Lafarge 
shareholders. The multiples analysis is, hence, a relevant method to be used once it 
enables a comparison with any quoted company, where the Enterprise Value as a multiple 
of Revenues (EV/Revenues) and Enterprise Value as a multiple of EBITDA 
(EV/EBITDA) are usually the most used multiples, which was also the one chose here. 
Comparing Exhibit 7 data with CRH having paid 1.25x EV/Revenues and 8.7x 
EV/EBITDA for LHN assets indicates that assets were sold at a relatively low price, even 
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more if compared to deals from the most recent years. However, it would be much harder 
to sell the huge amount of assets at a better price to different companies in a reasonable 
timescale, given the time pressure to get regulatory approval. Regarding US assets to 
Summit Materials for €420 million at 10x EV/EBITDA, it was reasonably priced and in 
line the strategic objectives to make de deal happen. The disposals were needed 
considering the merger objective. To conclude, could have been financially better, but it 
was strategically needed with no much available time for “amazing” deals. 
Question 5 
What would be the immediate impact of the merger on earnings per share for shareholders 
of each side (based on pre-merger EPS results)? What is your opinion about it?  
For this analysis is considered the latest EPS of Holcim and Lafarge separately (first semester 
of 2015), recalculated to be equally distributed for all shareholders right after the merger. 
Then, for this hypothetical scenario is converted from Euros (EUR) to Swiss Francs (CHF) 
the earnings per share (EPS) and share price (P) of Lafarge, as LafargeHolcim would be based 
in Switzerland and its shares mainly traded in this country too. Once Holcim already 
presented its first semester 2015 results both in EUR as well as CHF, the implied exchange 
ratio can be calculated and applied for Lafarge, which is also good to maintain more 
consistency with the same exchange ratio. 
On Exhibit TN4.1 the exchange ratio used by Holcim is calculated based on the values given 
in EUR and CHF. This ratio is applied to convert Lafarge EPS given in euros, reaching an 
EPS value of -1.76 CHF. Next, the share price of July 9, 2015 was used as the merger 
realization occurred on this date for calculating the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E). By using the 
same exchange rate already calculated, Lafarge share price is converted to CHF and, then, the 
P/E ratio was calculated, reaching the values presented on Exhibit TN4.2 
With Lafarge ownership weight provided in the Case Study, the expected EPS of 
LafargeHolcim is calculated as the weighted average EPS of Holcim and Lafarge in the new 
company, at the time it was formed (July 9, 2015), getting a new EPS of CHF 0.16. With it 
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LHN new P/E is of 459.5. If, however, Holcim P/E ratio of 44.2 was maintained constant, 
now as LafargeHolcim, and then using the new EPS of CHF 0.16, the new expected share 
price of LHN would be of mere CHF 6.88 in order to maintain the same ratio that Holcim had 
(see Exhibit TN4.3). It is considered Holcim P/E instead of Lafarge because, as stated 
previously, Holcim in fact acquired Lafarge. This value does not consider synergies and is a 
photograph of that moment, but it clearly demonstrates that the merger produced a strong EPS 
dilution effect for Holcim shareholders’. Nevertheless, this is not synonym of value 
destruction, but indicates a combination of two companies where one with a stronger financial 
position (Holcim) than the other leaded to a re-equilibrium of the earnings generated by each 
firm. In this case, the re-equilibrium benefitted ex-Lafarge shareholders that are now LHN 
shareholders. As synergies would not happen instantly, which would help to make this ratio 
better, the EPS impact for Holcim shareholders demonstrates that, at least for the short term 
and through a money perspective, this deal was a bad decision, once share price is overvalued 
based on a multiples and comparators analysis, thus unsustainable. This is observed on the 
share price fall of Exhibit 12 of the Case Study. On the contrary, for Lafarge investors this 
indicates that the merger was a good deal to recapitalize Lafarge at the expense of Holcim. 
LafargeHolcim – After the Merger and Conclusion 
One year after the deal, LHN share price has dropped 44%, while it was already flat since the 
pre-announcement yet in 2014. Meanwhile, the SXOP Index presented return of 6%, while 
SMI Index, the main index of Zurich’s stock exchange, had a loss of only 4% (Case Study 
Exhibit 12). The share price fall is consistent with the expected deterioration of some 
financial indicators, like P/E ratio as previously analyzed. The merger indeed seems to have 
provided a convenient recapitalization for Lafarge side at Holcim’s expense, caused by the 
weaker financials on Lafarge that were balanced by the better numbers of Holcim. Exhibit 16 
of the case study shows that in 2014 Lafarge had worse ratios than Holcim and other 
important competitors, and it was overvalued and delivering little return to investors. 
Furthermore, there was net loss of CHF2.86bn in the fourth quarter of 2015 caused by a 
CHF3bn charge attributed to asset impairment and “changing market condition” in Brazil, 
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China, Russia and Iraqxxi (Exhibit 14 of the case). The exposure to emerging markets (which 
have grown more with the merger and after the disposals), around two-thirds of earnings, is 
making LHN suffer with the collapse in commodity prices, so the potential advantage of a 
high exposure to emerging markets has not realized yet. Additionally, cement prices felt in 
important markets as a result of a lower economic activity whilst investors were reluctant 
about the capacity of the company to deliver the merger benefits amid tough global economic 
conditions. 
To analysts, results of 2015 suggested “a permanent adjustment to earnings potential”xxii, with 
no signs of recovery up to the moment, and while Eric Olsen is trying (and has to) 
demonstrate that merger benefits surpass the current problems, results and market 
performance do not reflect this. Olsen has the challenge to demonstrate too real scale 
economies with the merger, a not easy task considering that cement, the main product of 
LHN, is inherently a local business. 
Furthermore, Wolfgang Reitzle, which contributions “were instrumental for the completion of 
the LafargeHolcim merger” announces in February 2016 he would no longer be the 
company’s Chairman, being substituted by Beat Hess in May of the same year. Also, his seat 
on the Board was substituted by Jürg Oleas, which was from Holcim’s BoD previouslyxxiii. 
Such kind of change does not pass confidence to the market as well. This scenario is 
particularly destructive for shareholders from Holcim side, mainly because problems seem to 
come from Lafarge side, like Middle East operations. 
To conclude, given the adverse macroeconomic scenario and the long-term perspectives for 
the cement industry, this merger was a clever growth strategy. However, in the short-run 
challenges must be overcome, mainly synergies to be realized, offset cultural differences and 
improve soon cash-flow generation. Questions remain until then. Will ex-Holcim 
shareholders pay the necessary price and when stock price would recover pre-merger level 
compensating investors? When synergies would be big enough to demonstrate it was a clever 
decision? Although in the lung-run it is a good strategy, the “un-official” reasons and perverse 
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motivations of many actors involved in the deal, indicating to be the truly motivators for the 
merger, resulted in problems that pushed down Holcim share price and investors’ confidence, 
meaning that until the moment the merger was a bad deal to general Holcim shareholders, 
with the exception of Schmidheiny and his family, with no perspective yet of a truly recovery.  
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Teaching Note Appendixes 
 
Exhibit TN1 – Deal Related Values  
 
 
Exhibit TN2 – Multiples Analysis of the Price Paid by Holcim to Acquire Lafarge 
 
 
Exhibit TN3 – Additional Ratios  
 
 
Deal Realization and Premium
Lafarge share price as at July 9, 2015 61.68 €                    
Lafarge shares tendered 278,131,864
Market Cap of the shares tendered (in million) 17,155 €                  
In million CHF 17,910CHF              
In million Euros 17,050 €                  
Exchange rate at July 09 (CHF/EUR) 0.952 €                    
Premium paid over the shares tendered -0.61%




Paid EV by Holcim 19,483
Lafarge 2014 Revenues 13,598 Lafarge 2014 EBITDA 2,881
Lafarge 2015 estimated Revenues 
(from Exhibit 13.b) 14,617
Lafarge 2015 estimated EBITDA 
(from Exhibit 13.b) 3,188
EV/Revenues (2014) 1.43 EV/EBITDA (2014) 6.8
EV/Revenues (2015) 1.33 EV/EBITDA (2015) 6.1
Vs. Lafarge real EV/Revenues (2014) 2.17 Vs. Lafarge real EV/EBITDA (2014) 12.1
Exchange Rate (EUR/CHF) 1.058824CHF          
Obs. 1: for EV is considered the total consideration for the business combination, from Exhibit 9 Business Combination
Obs. 2: all Lafarge values were converted to CHF based on the exchange ratio used also for the EPS calculation
Obs. 3: the Lafarge ratios of FY 2014 were taken from Bloomberg
LafargeHolcim in 2015, Holcim 
before FY 2015 FY 2014 FY 2013 Lafarge FY 2014 FY 2013
12 Months Ending 12/31/2015 12/31/2014 12/31/2013 12 Months Ending 12/31/2014 12/31/2013
Long-Term Debt/Equity 41.60 45.73 47.04 Long-Term Debt/Equity 54.17 64.83
Long-Term Debt/Capital 25.89 28.94 28.92 Long-Term Debt/Capital 32.63 36.12
Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 20.27 23.29 23.15 Long-Term Debt/Total Assets 26.91 29.96
Total Debt/Equity 60.70 58.01 62.67 Total Debt/Equity 66.00 79.48
Total Debt/Capital 37.77 36.71 38.52 Total Debt/Capital 39.76 44.28
Total Debt/Total Assets 29.58 29.54 30.85 Total Debt/Total Assets 32.78 36.74
CFO/Total Liabilities 6.57 12.82 14.46 CFO/Total Liabilities 5.41 5.84
CFO/CapEx 1.17 1.28 1.26 CFO/CapEx 1.10 1.16
Source: Bloomberg Source: Bloomberg
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Exhibit TN4.1 – Earnings Per Share (EPS) 
 
 
Exhibit TN4.2 – Calculations to P/E Ratio 
 
 
Exhibit TN4.3 – LHN Expected Share Price with Constant P/E 
  
In € In CHF Exchange Ratio
Holcim EPS 1.53 1.62 1.058823529
Lafarge EPS -1.66 -1.76 1.058823529
All EPS were taken out from the each company's 
half-year Results, except for Lafarge in CHF, which 
was calculated
Lafarge Holcim
EPS (adj. In CHF) -1.76CHF     EPS 1.62CHF     
Price per share 65.31CHF     Price per share 71.55CHF  Both as at july 9, 2015




New EPS 0.16CHF       
Price per share 71.55CHF     As at july 9, 2015
New P/E 459.5
For Holcim shareholders
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